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We derive the optimal exchange rate policy for a small open economy subject to terms-of-
trade shocks. Firm owners and workers are risk averse but workers more so. Wages are given 
or partially indexed in the short run, and capital markets are imperfect. The government sets 
the exchange rate to allocate risk between workers and owners. With less risk-averse firms, 
and greater difference in risk aversion between workers and firms, the optimal exchange rate 
should vary little with pure terms-of-trade shocks but more with general shocks to prices. 
Optimal exchange rate variation is greater with indexed wages, but is smaller when firms 
behave monopolistically and when wage taxes (profit taxes) change procyclically 
(countercyclically) with export prices (import prices). The model gives policy rules for 
determining optimal variations of the exchange rate, and indicates when it is, and is not, 
optimal to join a currency union with trading partners, implying zero exchange rate variation. 
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 1. Introduction 
     The choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates, and the “optimal” degree of exchange 
rate flexibility, has long been fundamental issues in international economics, at least since the 
seminal contributions of Mundell (1960, 1961) and McKinnon (1963). After the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods fixed-rate system in the early 1970s the developed world has adopted a 
number of approaches to the managing of exchange rates. Many of these have involved pre-
determined currency bands within which each country's exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate 
relative to particular target currencies, or similar "implicit" (and in practice often narrower) 
bands. More recently we have witnessed two separate new developments. The first of these is the 
European currency union whereby most European Union member states have adopted the Euro 
as a common currency, from the start of 1999. The main purpose of the union can perhaps be 
viewed as the promotion of economic integration among the member nations, thereby reducing 
transaction costs and promoting specialization and competition within the union. The exchange 
rate policy of the Euro area versus the outside world is however less well defined and can most 
reasonably be described as flexible and demand-oriented. More recently other groups of 
countries, in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, are in the process of adopting common 
currencies.
1 The second development is the adoption of inflation targets as monetary policy in 
several OECD countries outside of the Euro area, such as Canada, Great Britain, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and Australia. In these countries the main role of exchange rate 
policy is the managing of long-run inflation, to be kept in a typical range around 2 %.  
     The purpose of this paper is to study a single government's choice of exchange rate policy 
focusing on roles of the exchange rate quite different from those just described and from the 
theoretical approaches in the related literature. We consider a stylized small open economy 
                                                 
1 See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) for overviews and discussions of recent development in this area.   1
                                                                                                                                                       
where the entire output is exported, all consumption goods are imported, nominal prices abroad 
are taken as exogenous by all domestic agents, and where competition creates complete pass-
through of foreign to domestic prices. We assume that the nominal wage has a high degree of 
rigidity (in section 2) or is partly indexed to the consumer price level (in section 3) for the period 
in question, while domestic prices are always fully flexible. The government is assumed to 
announce, and commit to, its exchange rate policy (the nominal exchange rate in each of the 
possible states that may occur in the “next period”), prior to the revelation of the next-period 
state. At the time the government announces the exchange rate policy, the “next-period” wage is 
determined in the private sector. Export and import prices are subject to stochastic i.i.d. shocks, 
firms are assumed to determine employment unilaterally in each state, and there is always some 
unemployment in the economy, resulting from short-run wage rigidities, in line with standard 
approaches in “new Keynesian” macroeconomics. 
     We assume that individuals in the economy can be separated into one of two distinct groups. 
The first, workers, consume out of wages, while the second, firm owners, consume out of profits. 
Within each group, all individuals are assumed to have constant and identical degrees of relative 
risk aversion, but risk aversion may differ between workers and owners. In our model, the 
"public" thus cannot be identified by a “representative individual”, household, or producer as 
assumed e.g. by Obstfeld and Rogoff  (1996, 1998). The risk preferences of individuals in each 
group are then shown to matter for the government’s constrained efficient exchange rate policy, 
as the exchange rate rule has important consequences for the short-run variations in wages and 
owner incomes. We will generally assume that workers are more risk averse than firm owners 
are, following e.g. the traditional implicit labor contracts literature (Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983); 
Parsons (1986)), e.g. because they have greater immediate consumption needs relative to income, 
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and relatively fewer effective means of diversifying risks than firms. This should be true even in 
the presence of capital markets. 
    Our main result is that when risk markets are incomplete, the final optimal exchange rate 
policy serves as a device for sharing macroeconomic risk between the two groups considered. 
This result is similar to the ones of the “implicit contract” theory where wages are determined 
out of the direct control of authorities. We find a simple closed-form analytical solution to this 
problem, one that generalizes the familiar Arrow-Borch condition for optimal risk allocation 
between two parties (see Borch (1962)). In some important special cases, in particular when only 
workers are risk averse and only export prices are variable, the optimal rule is to keep the 
exchange rate invariable over time. That means that the government should commit to a 
monetary union with relevant trade partners. This main result holds both in the basic case, 
studied in section 2, and under three extensions of the basic model, in section 3, to indexation, 
taxation and imperfect competition. The details of the optimal policy rule are somewhat reacher 
with each of these extensions, as explained there as well as in the concluding section 4. 
     In the literature several attempts have been made to derive “optimal” exchange rate rules. 
Most of this work compares the efficiency of keeping the exchange rate fixed versus letting it be 
(fully or partly) flexible. Hamada and Sakurai (1978), Flood (1979), Flood and Marion (1982), 
Aizenman and Frenkel (1985), Glick and Wihlborg (1990), Hodrick (1989), Weber (1981), Artis 
and Currie (1981) and Fukuda and Hamada (1987), all extend Mundell’s framework to include 
roles for expectations. Artis and Currie (1981) and Fukuda and Hamada (1987) find that both 
output and prices are stabilized under fixed rates with "velocity shocks", and destabilized with 
"demand shocks", and that the choice between regimes rests on which of these types of shocks is 
more important. Most of these papers are based on ad-hoc criteria, usually involving output-
inflation tradeoffs, and not on optimization from “first principles”. A different strand of the   3
                                                
literature, represented by Lucas (1982), Helpman and Razin (1982), Magill and Quinzi (1996) 
and Neumeyer (1998), focuses on the roles for exchange rates in allocating risk in general 
equilibrium models with incomplete markets. In particular, Neumeyer finds that a monetary 
union is under certain assumptions preferable to a system of flexible exchange rates, provided 
that the gains thereby achieved, due to elimination of excess volatility of nominal variables, 
exceed the cost of changing the asset structure. A large recent literature (e.g. Frankel and Rose 
(1997, 1998), Devereux and Engel (2000), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2002)) studies the 
optimum currency area issue from welfare-maximizing standpoints. The comparison is however 
also here between a currency union and a flexible exchange rate system and generally under 
assumptions different from ours; in particular, risk allocation is unimportant. Other contributions 
studying welfare properties of alternative exchange rate systems are Aizenman (1994), Buiter 
(2000), Chinn and Miller (1998), Sutherland (1995) and Cooper and Kempf (2004). In particular, 
Buiter (2000), and Cooper and Kempf (2004) argue against a monetary union when there are 
asymmetric shocks and only monetary policy is used for stabilization. Cooper and Kempf (2004) 
however stress that when also fiscal policy can be used, it is very hard to argue against a 
currency union on efficiency grounds. Sutherland (1995) considers efficiency properties of 
commitment to a band policy, versus either a fixed or fully flexible rate, using a Poole (1970) 
type of analysis where the variance of certain target variables is minimized. Many of the above 
papers assume full flexibility of prices and wages and thus do not directly follow the Mundell 
tradition. Price stickiness has been considered by Flood and Rose (1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995, 1998), Devereux and Engel (1998, 1999), Rankin (1998) and Hau (1999); the latter paper 
also (as we do) assumes wage rigidity. In none of this work risk allocation plays any role for the 
government’s optimal choice of exchange rate regime.
2
 
2The most closely related work in this respect is perhaps that of Huizinga (1997), on the political economy of 
exchange rate determination in a developing country, where the exchange rate can be overvalued in the political   4
     Our approach is unorthodox in several respects, first by focusing on the optimal exchange rate 
policy as a risk allocation device; secondly by deriving a target rule for the exchange rate, where 
the government’s optimal exchange rate policy is affected by certain underlying fundamentals; 
and thirdly, by focusing completely on real variables.  
   We have made a few simplifications that limit the scope of our analysis, in particular, we do 
not study the case in which individuals can smooth their consumption by borrowing and lending 
in capital markets, and are instead assumed to always consume their current income, as is 
standard in the new open economy literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)). We do not either take 
into account possible government concerns about inflation. Nevertheless we believe that our 
approach may serve to emphasize and clarify the role of exchange rate policy in such a particular 
setting. In section 4 below we discuss some of our main assumptions further, and conclude that 
most results are likely to hold, under a wide range of alternative cases. 
 
2. The basic model  
    Consider an economy where output is homogeneous and exported in its entirety, and a single 
consumption good is imported. The economy has a large and given number of identical firms 
operating in perfectly competitive markets.  There is a given labor force L. The country is small 
and does not affect world market prices of export or import goods.
 3  
     The economy is stationary across periods.
4 We assume that the economy in any period 
                                                                                                                                                        
equilibrium when the medial voter gains from low import prices; and Frenkel and Razin (1989), who stress the 
equivalence between exchange rate policy and tax policy when there may be “dual” exchange rates. The mechanisms 
by which distributional factors come into play, and the principles for determining the exchange rate, are here 
however quite different from ours.  
3 Not very much would change if firms were monopolistic competitors in world markets. Generally, optimal prices 
set by firms would still fluctuate procyclically, in the same way as under exogenous prices here, and be positively 
related to output, although not necessarily in exactly the same way as here. 
4 Stationarity here follows from the time-independence of all states.     5
experiences one out of two possible states, 1 or 2; which can easily be generalized to an arbitrary 
number of states. In state i the world market prices of exports and imports are pi and qi, 
respectively, i = 1,2. Viewed ex ante the probabilities of state 1 and 2 occurring are β and 1-β, 
respectively.
5 In each state the government sets the exchange rate zi, where an increase in zi 
implies a weakening of the home currency. Export goods are then sold abroad at a price of pi zi, 
and import goods are bought by the home country at a price of qi zi, both in terms of the home 
currency. The only role of government is to set the exchange rate. In the next section we will 
study the role of taxes or public expenditures. The current account is assumed to be balanced at 
all times. 
     In this model we will assume the following sequence of events. In period 1, prior to the 
revelation of pi and qi , the government announces nominal exchange rate zi, i = 1,2, for each of 
the two states that may occur. In period 1 a nominal, and state-invariant, wage w is also agreed 
between private-sector agents.
6 None of the results below depend on the exact level of w, only on 
some unemployment actually resulting in equilibrium, and the labor market thus does not clear 
given this wage, in neither of the states. The government's exchange rate regime announcement 
is assumed to be fully credible. In particular, the government is not allowed to set the nominal 
exchange rate after observing the nominal wage set by the private sector. In period 2, the 
corresponding state (i.e. whether i equals 1 or 2) is revealed and the exchange rate zi is 
                                                 
5 One difference between our approach and one where the stochastic variables (or their logs) follow time-
independent Brownian motion or Markov processes is that we will here have a “drift toward the mean” in the 
variables, while the alternative processes yield no systematic future movement of the state variable. We argue that 
our assumption is relevant in many situations, in particular when “long-run averages” are known with reasonable 
certainty; and when the short-run development of prices can be characterized by "business cycles" (with e.g. 
Brownian motion processes, the notion of "business cycles" is meaningless in the sense that one will have no idea of 
when the current state is “good” or “bad”). An extension of the current analysis to other stochastic processes must 
await future research. 
6 The wage may perhaps most naturally be viewed as set through wage bargaining.. The important thing here is 
however not the exact mechanism for setting the wage, but rather the property that wages are predetermined before 
the period-specific shock is realized so as to maintain a given average macro employment level. 
  immediately determined in accordance to the government's commitment in period 1. Firms, 
taking the wage, all prices and the exchange rate as given, then determine output competitively. 
   Note that this two-period basic model solution can be viewed as repeating over time, in 
identical fashion. Indeed, such repetition may be viewed as necessary for the government to 
establish credibility of its chosen rule, by observation of repeated adherence to this rule.  
   Firms have Cobb-Douglas production functions L
γ where γ∈(0,1) is the elasticity of output 
with respect to labor (L) and also the factor share of labor under perfect competition. Firms’ 
nominal profits in the home currency are given by: 
ii i i i   =   w  p zL L
γ π −    i=1,2                 (1) 
Firms maximize πi with respect to employment Li  in any given period, yielding the first-order 
conditions: 
  6
w                                            i=1,2                                                          (2) 
(1 )
i i i L  =    p z
γ γ
−−
This leads to the labor demand equations: 
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1
1 γ γ γ
−
−− γ −
      i=1,2                                                     (3) 
yielding the following expression for firms’ nominal profits: 
                        
1
11 ) i i i   =  (1 ( w p z
1
γ γ




      i=1,2                                  (4) 
Assume a given number of perfectly competitive firms in the economy, normalized to one. Firm 
owners’ utility of current profits is assumed to be as follows: 
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Note that since qizi is the nominal price of the import good in terms of the home currency, the argument of the function (5) is the consumption value of profits. 1-α is the (constant) coefficient 
of relative risk aversion. We assume that α ∈ (0,1], i.e., firm owners are generally risk averse but 
may as a special case (α=1) be risk neutral. 
     Individual workers are similarly risk averse with (constant) coefficient of relative risk 
aversion equal to 1-ρ ∈ (0,1), and have following utility function preferences over the current 
real consumption value of wages: 
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L    =    V      i=1,2   (7) 
Here Li workers are employed, while L-Li unemployed; the latter have no current income in the 
model and thus by assumption zero utility. We will assume that δ≤1. When δ=1, the government 
preference function which represents all workers is said to be utilitarian, since Vi then is the sum 
of the utilities of employed workers (since as noted unemployed workers are assumed to have no 
income and thus zero utility). Holding the real wage of employed workers constant, δ<1 would 
represent “decreasing returns” in the eyes of government, when employment increases. δ∈(ρ,1) 
may imply that workers’ individual utilities are still aggregated as before, but that a given 
reduction in unemployment is viewed as more gainful when employment at the outset is lower. 
     The government is assumed to be able and willing to commit to exchange rates zi in each of 
the possible future states, before the state is known. Here, the absolute levels of the exchange 
rates are unimportant for the solution of the model; only the relative exchange rates between the 
states matter. This follows because the wage is set simultaneously with or immediately following 
  7the government’s commitment to future exchange rates, so as to achieve a given expected level 
of employment. In the formal analysis, we then only need to study the government’s 
determination of relative exchange rates.  
    From (3), (5) and (7), the utilities of both workers and firms as groups are increasing in z as 
long as there is some unemployment. If the government follows a discretionary policy, it would 
then have an ex post incentive to set the exchange rate zi at a sufficiently high level for 
employment to be maximized. This would however violate not only the condition that the 
average real wage is given, but also the expectations of labor market participants. The other 
agents in the economy will anticipate this, and it may lead to non-optimal decisions (or a 
breakdown of the model). Full commitment to a given exchange rate policy is thus required. 
     In this light, the government can be viewed as maximizing the ex ante expected utility of the 
representative owner (EU), taking the expected utility of workers as a group (EV), and the 
expected real wage, as given.
7 The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as: 
        ]. V ) (1 + V [   U ) (1   +   U =    V   E   -   U   E   =   H 2 1 2 1 β β λ β β λ − − −                               (8) 
H is maximized with respect to z1 and z2.
8 Taking logs, the two resulting equations can be 
expressed in the following way: 
, ) K = q )log )(1 (   +   z )]log )(1 ( + [ + p log ( i i i γ ρ α γ ρ α α δ α δ − − − − − −   i=1,2    (9) 
K is a constant and the same for both equations. Combining the two equations contained in (9) 
yields the following expression: 
 
                                                 
7Note the asymmetry following from the government (or its monetary authority) maximizing expected long-run 
utility taken as given that each firm maximizes short-run profits in each state. Thus the government is assumed not to 
have instruments that directly correct the inefficiencies that result from short-run behavior of firms, nor from workers 
decisions regarding wage setting. 
8Note that the problem may equivalently be formulated as one where the utility of workers is maximized given firm 
owners’ utility; or where the government maximizes an asymmetric Nash product of EU and EV respectively. 
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         (10) 
(10) sums up, in a remarkably simple and intuitive way, the factors behind optimal exchange rate 
policy in this type of economy. It can be interpreted as an optimal risk allocation problem, 
between owners on the one hand, and workers on the other, when output is affected by short-run 
fluctuations in the exchange rate and export and import prices. It can be viewed as a generalized 
version of Borch’s (1962) condition for optimal risk sharing between two parties signing a 
mutual and binding insurance contract. (10) can readily be generalized to an arbitrary number (or 
a continuum) of states, and is then a condition for comparing any two of these states.
9  
     Interpreting (10) implies analyzing how the optimal exchange rate variation is determined and 
depends on the agents' degree of risk aversion and on the nature of the shocks affecting import 
and export prices. We will consider three main cases I-III. 
 
Case I. A shock that increases pi and qi proportionally 
Since the coefficients before log(p2/p1) and log(q2/q1) sum to one, the relative exchange rate, 
log(z1/z2), should in this case be adjusted equivalently, leaving import prices (qizi) and export 
prices (pizi) in terms of domestic currency, as well as output (and so employment), invariant to 
such shocks. This implies no real effects on the economy. “Real” and relative prices also remain 
unchanged even though all prices change simultaneously as a result of the “nominal” shock. A 
full opposite exchange rate adjustment should here exactly counteract such a shock.  
 
Case II.  A shock that affects only relative export prices 
Here, only p2/p1 changes. A shock of this type can be interpreted either as a pure terms-of-trade 
 
9The extension to more states is easily seen from (8), where we may simply introduce more states with individual 
probabilities attached to them (or a continuum of states with an associated probability measure). 
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change, or as a shift in domestic productivity, i.e. a “real” shock. Recall our assumption that 
ρ≤δ≤1. We may here in turn identify four interesting subcases, A-D. Subcases A-C arise when 
workers are equally or more risk averse than the firms with respect to total income (i.e. α ≥ ρ). 
 
A: The exchange rate should adjust so as to leave export prices, pizi, (in terms of domestic 
currency) constant across states 
This is optimal only if workers and firms are equally risk averse with respect to income or there 
are constant returns in the production function. That is, either α=ρ, or γ→1, respectively. (The 
coefficient before log (p2/p1) will then equal one.) Thus, when the two parties are equally risk 
averse or there are constant returns to scale (CRS) (though risk averse agents), it is optimal to 
keep output (and employment) constant across states, and let all uncertainty (all possible price 
fluctuations) be translated through a full variation of the import (and consumer) prices in the 
home currency, qizi.  
 
B: The exchange rate should be kept fixed across states 
This is optimal only if the firm risk aversion coefficient equals the coefficient by which the 
government aggregates individual workers in the utility function, and workers are more risk 
averse than firms are. This holds when α=δ>ρ (coefficient before log(p2/p1) will now equal zero) 
which implies that the government’s welfare function aggregating up workers’ utilities now 
exhibits more risk aversion with respect to wages than with respect to employment. The optimal 
solution for the exchange rate yields constant real wages across states. Producers then face the 
full variation in world market export prices, and adjust output accordingly and workers as a 
group will then absorb more risk through variations in employment. We will argue that this case 
is important as it provides a theoretical support for a monetary union. Note that it covers the   11
important special case α=δ=1, where owners are risk neutral (α=1) and workers risk averse 
(ρ<1), and all workers have the same weight in the government utility function representing them 
(δ=1). 
     As long as ρ<α<δ (the coefficient before log (p2/p1) is strictly between zero and one) we will 
have a solution intermediate between cases A and B. The optimal government policy will be to 
adjust the exchange rate so as to partly dampen the effects that a shock may have on output, 
consumer prices, and real wage across states. Recall that in comparison to the solution where pizi 
is a constant, wages and consumer prices will vary much less. This will be definitely efficient 
when workers are more risk averse with respect to income variations than firms are (ρ<α), and 
more so the greater the difference in risk aversion, and the less risk averse firms are. 
 
C: ρ≤δ<α 
Now the coefficient before log (p2/p1) in (10) is negative. The exchange rate should then be 
appreciated when the terms of trade are weakened. Now efficient risk allocation implies opposite 
movements in employment and real consumer prices, and more volatile employment than under 
fixed exchange rates (which as noted would occur under case B). This is accomplished by further 
stimulating exports when there is an improvement in terms of trade. Intuitively, firms are now 
“nearly risk neutral”. Profits can then be allowed to vary relatively more between states. Workers 
will however have their (individual and aggregate) utility affected in two different ways: With a 
reduction in the export prices, it is optimal to increase the individual worker real income.
10  With 
an increase in export prices, it will instead be optimal to increase employment. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Recall that the workers only consume foreign produced goods.    12
D: ρ>α 
Here firms are more risk averse than workers. Then the coefficient before log (p2/p1) is greater 
than one. It is now particularly important to protect firms against risk, and firms’ output (and 
employment) should fluctuate in the opposite direction to domestic import prices. This is 
accomplished by making the counteracting change in zi greater than the change in pi, i.e. 
log(z1/z2) > log (p2/p1). This reduces employment in the “good” state, while import (and 
domestic) prices in terms of the domestic currency are made to fluctuate by more than the 
exogenous fluctuation in export prices, also in terms of the domestic currency.  
    We will argue that cases C and D are less relevant than cases A and B. For one thing, the 
model and its solutions are most easy to interpret and justify when δ=1 and all workers count 
equally in the government’s utility function. Then case C becomes irrelevant. Moreover, a main 
point of departure is that workers are more risk averse than firm owners, eliminating case D. In 
the following we will accordingly concentrate on cases A and B. 
 
Case III. A shock that affects only relative import prices 
Since the coefficient in (10) before log(q2/q1) is one minus the coefficient before log(p2/p1), the 
discussion concerning this coefficient is essentially the same as that concerning the latter 
coefficient, only with opposite sign. This coefficient is closer to one, the closer α is to δ, but the 
same coefficient closer to zero the more similar the agents’ risk preferences are (α=ρ) and the 
more responsive labor demand is to prices (γ→1).  
    In summarizing the results, the following conditions speak in favor of relatively small or none 
exchange rate fluctuations: 
•  When there is a shock to export prices and firms’ relative risk aversion coefficient 1-α is 
close to 1-δ. A special case is one in which all workers count equally in the government   13
utility function (δ=1), this implies firm risk neutrality. 
•  When there is a shock to export prices and workers are highly risk averse with respect to 
income and more than firms. 
•  When there is a shock to import prices and the two parties are equally risk averse with 
respect to income. 
•  With a shock either to export or import prices, and when there are strongly decreasing returns 
to scale of the macro production function in labour (and correspondingly, the factor share of 
labour in GNP is relatively low). 
 
   Note here finally that the case of identical risk preferences is analytically identical to the 
standard case studied in most of the literature cited above, where a representative individual is 
considered. With fluctuations only in export prices, the exchange rate should then be adjusted 
perfectly to these prices, or kept fixed (enter a monetary union) when the import prices are the 
ones that fluctuate.  
   Let us summarise the most relevant results obtained from cases I – III in Table 1. 
 
 
 Table 1 
  CASE I  CASE II  CASE III 




∆log(p2/p1) = φ; ∆log(q2/q1) = 0  ∆log(p2/p1) = 0 
∆log(q2/q1) = φ 
 
    α=ρ and γ→1 
(but α≥ρ) 






∆log(z1/z2)=φ  p1z1=p2z2 
  
qizi vary 



















= φ  if  α=δ] 
 
 
3. Extensions of the basic model 
3.1 Wage indexation 
     We have so far assumed that the wage is nominally fixed in any given period. Alternatively, 
assume that the wages are determined such that there is still unemployment in each period, but 
the wage is adjusted (imperfectly) ex post to unexpected changes in workers’ cost of living. This 
can be represented by a wage indexation scheme of the following form: 
θ ) ( 0 i iz q w w =   i=1,2                   (11) 
Here w0 is a base wage (similar to w in section 2 above), and θ a parameter indicating the degree 
of indexation.
11 When θ=0 there is no indexation and we are back to the model already analyzed 
above. When θ=1, by contrast, there is full indexation and workers’ real wages are kept 
                                                 
11Note however that when θ>0, the level of w0 will generally not correspond to the level of w in section 2 above, 
assuming that workers’ wage demands are set so as to maintain a given (average) utility level of employed workers. 
This feature will however in no way affect any of the basic results from the model.  
  14invariable across states. θ ∈ (0,1) represents intermediate cases where values closer to unity 
imply relatively greater degrees of indexation. 
    The labor demand equations equivalent to (3) can now be written as follows: 
11 1 1
11 1 1 1
0 i ii i   =   w p q z L
θ θ
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L    =    V     i=1,2   (14) 
      We may now also derive a new expression for optimal government exchange rate 
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   The main interesting change implied by wage indexation comes via the term 1-θ in the 
denominator of the expression (15), before log (p2/p1) and log (q2/q1). This term implies that the 
optimal variation in the exchange rate under the case of an indexed wage, is greater than the 
equivalent variation under a fixed wage. In other words, the greater the degree of indexation, the 
greater is the optimal variation in the exchange rate, when only export prices change. The 
intuitive explanation of this result can be found from inspection of the expressions (13) and (14), 
for the utilities of firms and workers respectively as viewed by the government. In both 
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expressions, the exponent to zi enters with a factor 1-θ, implying that variations in z are now less 
efficient as a means of affecting the respective utilities. With given risk aversion parameters, a 
greater variation in z is then required in order to achieve a given allocation of risk between the 
two groups across states, in response to a given variation in export or import prices. It is 
consequently necessary for the government to vary the exchange rate by more in order to leave 
workers and firm owners equally well off.
12 With greater wage indexation, the exchange rate 
becomes a less powerful mechanism for achieving an efficient allocation of risk between workers 
and owners. Greater changes in the exchange rate between states are then required to achieve a 
given (optimal) intertemporal risk allocation.  
     In the special cases where the solution in section 2 above was to keep the exchange rate fixed, 
nothing is changed by indexation (case B above). Moreover, when export and import prices 
change proportionally (a "monetary" shock) the exchange rate should still, as in section 2, be 
changed in this same proportion, again leaving all real variables constant. 
      Note also that if the government faces a choice between a fixed-exchange-rate scheme and a 
variable one, this choice is in our model not affected by the degree of indexation. The reason is 
that the optimal risk and output allocation are independent of the degree of indexation. 
Indexation only affects the variability of nominal prices and wages, and not the variability of real 
prices for consumers and producers. Thus the utilities from solutions with fixed and optimally 
variable exchange rates, as viewed by the government, are the same whether this latter exchange 
rate varies little and the wage is totally rigid, or whether the exchange rate varies substantially 
under wage indexation.  
 
 
12Another related intuitive explanation is that when there are changes in export prices only, the model in section 2 
above yields an optimal tradeoff between productive allocation (variations in labor input) and risk allocation. As long 
as risk aversion coefficients and labor demand are unaltered, this optimal tradeoff is not changed by the introduction 
of indexation, requiring a greater adjustment in z when wages are indexed.  3.2 Taxation 
     In practice the government has other mechanisms than exchange rate variations available, for 
affecting the riskiness of wage and profit income. As pointed out by a number of authors, such as 
Varian (1980), Agell (1992), and Bertola and Koeniger (2004), the tax system may play such a 
role. We will here extend our basic model above, that is without indexation, to a case where 
profit and wage incomes are subject to taxation, and the possibility that tax rates may differ 
between states. We here study optimal exchange rate variation for given  tax rates: the 
government is thus not assumed to maximize its objective function with respect to the latter.
13 
Assume that after-tax profit income for owners is given by (modifying (5)): 










  i=1,2     (16) 
where 1-τi is a state-specific tax parameter for each of the states i = 1,2, used by the government 
to affect the general profit level in each of the two period types. Similarly, assume that after-tax 
real wages are given by (modifying (6)): 










                i=1,2 ,        (17) 
where 1-ηi are tax parameters affecting real net wage income. Increases in τi and ηi then imply 
that the respective state-contingent profit or wage tax is lowered. We can here assume that the 
government adjusts the levels of taxes in such a way that net expected tax revenue is exactly zero 
(which implies that some of the tax rates will be negative). We now find a new formula for 
optimal exchange rate determination, similar to (10): 
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13 We thus do not address the issue of how tax revenue is spent, or how large it is. Since only relative tax rates 
matter for the solution to the model, we may here assume that the absolute rates are adjusted such that expected 
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   (18) 
 
The way, in which the rule for setting relative exchange rates is changed, is now affected by the 
state-dependent variation in average tax rates 1-τi and 1-ηi. It may here be reasonable to assume 
that the government uses the tax system to smooth real wage income but not profits across states. 
We will in turn consider both cases. Notice that profits and wage income for each employed 
worker change across states for given exchange rates when import prices q change; while when 
export price changes, only profits will be exposed to additional variation. Consider then the case 
where q2 > q1 such that real wage and profit incomes are lower in state 2. The government would 
naturally counteract the effect of a higher q2 on the workers’ income by decreasing their taxes in 
the second state. This implies setting η2/η1 > 1, making the log (η2/η1) positive.
14  We see that in 
general this is likely to increase the optimal variation in the exchange rate (i.e. the exchange rate 
in state 2 is going to be much lower than in state 1), and more so the larger η2 becomes in 
comparison to η1. Thus, a larger appreciation of the exchange rate will occur as a result of a tax 
relief and of the risk sharing mechanism. These two will just more than compensate the loss in 
real income due to an increase in import prices. Note however that if the exchange rate in state 2 
is allowed to appreciate a great deal (at least relatively to the exchange rate that will prevail in 
state1), it will create a large swing in export incomes and so in profits to the capitalists. Profits 
can be smoothed by a combination of exchange rate changes and tax changes such as τ2/τ1 > 1. In 
fact, the exchange rate will vary less if the government implements procyclical profit taxes. 
Intuitively, from (18) we can see that for fixed taxes to the workers and export prices, if the 
 
14 Note that τπ and ηw are the capitalists’ and workers’ incomes after tax, respectively. Thus, a lower τ or η 
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log(q2/q1) increases and log(τ2/τ1) does so less than proportionately
15, there will be a lower 
increase in log (z1/z2) than would otherwise occur if no tax relief was implemented for exporters. 
   Note that in the interesting and special case where log(q2/q1) = log(τ2/τ1) = log(η2/η1) (i.e., the 
retained shares of incomes after tax for both owners and workers are changed in proportion to 
import prices), the exchange rate should be kept constant. 
   Introducing new government instruments through taxes opens up a new and very interesting 
perspective in the model, namely the issue of what variations in tax rates are optimal for a given 
exchange rate target. Consider in particular a fixed exchange rate, which is the obvious “target” 
under a monetary union. We see that equation (18) can easily be fulfilled for z1/z2 constant, and 
p2/p1 and/or q2/q1 changing, by adjusting the relative tax rates appropriately. We have just 
analysed this above, for the case of variation in import prices alone. The same analysis can be 
done when export prices vary, as when log (p2/p1) increases and the coefficient before log (p2/p1) 
is positive. Complementary policy rules, such as either a countercyclical variation in the profit 
tax rate, or a procyclical variation in the wage tax rate, can thus affect the optimal exchange rate 
fluctuations in different ways. Achieving a stable, and at the same time optimal, exchange rate 
may here be implemented through either a procyclically variable wage tax, which should be 
higher in the state with high export prices, or a countercyclical profit tax, which is reduced when 
import prices are high. 
 
3.3 Imperfect competition 
   In the analysis above all prices are assumed to be given in the world market. Ceteris paribus, 
perfect competition will allow international price changes to pass on perfectly to domestic 
 
implies lower taxes collected by the government. 
15 Notice that if the log(τ2/τ1) increases in the same proportion as the log(q2/q1), it can result in an appreciation of the 
exchange rate in the state 2. Reasonably, if producers are going to get equally (or more than) compensated with 
lower taxes when import prices go up, they will have to face an appreciation of the exchange rate in state 2. consumer and producer markets. In many practical cases the assumption of perfect competition 
will be violated for several reasons. This is likely to be the case when domestic exporters sell in 
consumer brand markets with differentiated products, as analyzed e.g. in the seminal paper by 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and when a country specializes (almost) fully on  the production of one 
or a few goods, producers may behave monopolistically instead of competitively.
16  
     We will in this section extend our basic model to encompass the case of monopolistic 
producers in the export sector. Assume then that instead of (1), firms’ profits are given by 
  20
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− −
where pi now may be interpreted as a fixed parameter in the (world) demand function for export 
goods, and σ is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of the export price with respect to production 
in the export sector, which is the inverse of the elasticity of world market demand for the home 
good with respect to export prices, where 0<σ<1. Except for (1a), the model is the same as that in 
section 2. We can then simply replace γ in that version of the model, by γ(1-σ) in the current 
version, and everything else remains the same. Notice that γ(1-σ) will always be  positive. The 
formula for optimal exchange rate variation becomes 
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This is a simple extension of the formula (10) in section 2. Considering the standard case where 
both coefficients before log(p2/p1) and log(q2/q1) are positive, the effect of imperfect competition 
 
16In fact monopolistic competition does not depend on producers being large, but only on them being specialized 
given that products are differentiated (which is not the case in our model). It is however generally clear those larger 
producers will have more power to determine their own prices. See Helpman and Krugman (1991) for discussion of 
such issues.   21
is seen to be a relative increase in the  weight of log(q2/q1), and a relative decrease in that of 
log(p2/p1). Thus in particular, when only export demand fluctuates, the exchange rate response to 
such fluctuations ought to be even smaller, than in our basic model of section 2. Moreover, when 
there is a shock affecting p2 causing upward shift in the demand function for exports (i.e. p2L2
-γσ 
shifs up), greater monopoly power (measured by σ) implies lower variation in the exchange rate 
(i.e. z2 will not change a lot with respect to z1). Intuitively, the output response to such demand 
fluctuations is now smaller, and this is the reason why there will be less of a need to adjust the 
exchange rate (i.e. revaluing in the good state will be that large). In this sense, the monopolistic 
case strengthens our basic case for a relatively invariable exchange rate. Finally, one could add 
that under monopoly conditions, wage and profit taxes can be additionally implemented to 
ameliorate the effect of monopoly power on the low degree of pass-through. 
 
4. Conclusions and discussion 
     We have derived an optimal rule for the exchange rate when future states are uncertain and 
the nominal wage is either fully rigid in the short run, or partly indexed to the nominal exchange 
rate. The main role of the exchange rate in our model is to allocate risk optimally between two 
groups in the economy, workers and owners. We find that when nominal export and import 
prices change proportionately in response to the occurrence of a shock, the government should 
adjust the relative exchange rate to leave all domestic variables constant. With stochastic sectoral 
("real") shocks where import prices are likely to vary (perhaps considerably) less than export 
prices, if wages are fixed in the short run (as in section 2) and both workers and owners are risk 
averse but workers more so, the exchange rate should be allowed to appreciate in response to a 
positive shock to export prices alone. Such appreciation should be only partial in the sense that 
home and world market export prices should move in the same direction.    22
   The exchange rate should adjust fully (and leave home export prices constant) only when 
workers and firm owners have equal degrees of relative risk aversion. In another important 
practical case, with risk neutral owners and risk averse workers (and utilitarian government 
preferences representing workers), the exchange rate should be kept constant.  
    Section 3 studies three different extensions to the basic model. First, when wages are partially 
indexed to the nominal consumer price level ex post, as studied in subsection 3.1, the exchange 
rate should generally vary more, while neither real variables nor the choice between a fixed- 
versus variable-rate regime is affected by wage indexation. Secondly, in subsection 3.2 we study 
the effects of state-variable wage and profit taxes. We here show that such taxes modify the 
optimal exchange rate rule, in particular by making the exchange rate less sensitive to export 
prices (import prices) changes when wage taxes (profit taxes) move procyclically 
(countercyclically). We here also note that a fixed exchange rate can now be implemented as the 
optimal rate, by varying tax rates appropriately, thus strengthening the case for a monetary union 
under cases where individual countries have the possibility of independent tax policies. The third 
extension, in subsection 3.3, deals with imperfect competition for exporters. The main effect of 
imperfect competition for optimal exchange rate policy is to further reduce the variability of 
exchange rate fluctuations when export demand fluctuates, as output fluctuations in this case are 
typically dampened relative to the competitive case.    
    We have above argued that "real" shocks to the economy on the average imply less variation 
in import prices than in export prices. This assumption has at least two justifications. First, 
efficient production in a small open economy is likely to imply that exports are concentrated to a 
relatively small range of goods, while imports are likely to be much more diversified.
17 
Independent fluctuations in relative prices among foreign goods might then largely cancel out for 
                                                 
17 Such an argument could clearly justify multiple-equilibrium outcomes of a sort similar to those analyzed  by 
Frankel and Rose (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2002). The idea here is that integration into a monetary union   23
the composite of imports, but not for the composite of exports. The other justification is that 
fluctuations in pi can be interpreted (wholly or partly) as domestic productivity shocks. Such 
shocks would lead to greater fluctuations in pi, but in qi only when consumer goods in question 
are produced domestically. 
     The more traditional “representative individual” case arises in our model when owners and 
workers have the same risk preferences. In the no-indexation case, given fluctuations in export 
prices alone, the exchange rate should then adjust fully to these in the short run, and optimal 
responses are the same to price shocks as to "real" shocks. Moreover, the more consumer prices 
covary with export prices, the less should the exchange rate adjust. In our case by contrast, 
distinguishing between risk neutral owners and risk averse workers, results are very different. 
We thus demonstrate that the rather plausible issue, of differential risk preferences between 
workers and firm owners, may matter greatly for the optimal exchange rate rule. 
     It should be stressed that our derived solution provides an optimal commitment rule that the 
government prefers to announce, and be able to follow even after the respective state has been 
revealed. When this optimal rule implies “very small” or zero fluctuations in the exchange rate, 
the model can be argued to give a theoretical justification for a monetary union between the 
countries to which the model applies. Alternatively, an exchange rate band could be viewed as a 
mechanism for committing to small but nonzero exchange rate fluctuations.
18  
   As noted, our analysis is based several assumptions which may need further discussion. The 
following discussion should also serve as a scope for future research. 
i) Individuals in the economy are divided into two well-defined groups, workers and 
owners. This assumption drives many of our interesting results. Most modern approaches to 
                                                                                                                                                        
could promote intra-industry specialization, which in turn leads to greater fluctuations in p2/p1.
18In the multi-state case, a currency band can only directly determine the maximum variation in the exchange 
rate and not the optimal relative rate associated with each state. It may still then perhaps be viewed as an 
acceptable approximation to the optimal solution.    24
                                                
international macroeconomics (as represented e.g. by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)) take the 
representative agent approach whereby this issue is by definition excluded. Our justification is 
the empirical observation that workers (at least in most European countries) largely hold their 
wealth in their own human capital and to some degree in residential capital, while owners and 
managers to a much greater extent hold their wealth in production and financial capital. In most 
European countries, workers own a relatively small fraction of corporate stock.
19 Fluctuations in 
household wealth can then overwhelmingly be represented by fluctuations in real wages (and by 
fluctuations in the value of home equity, which is typically correlated with average wages), while 
for owners and managers much more of wealth depends on business values. Most of workers’ 
wealth is also largely undiversifiable (e.g. financial equities such as stocks and bonds cannot be 
issued on the basis of human capital), while owners/manager wealth can much more easily be 
diversified. This should imply that workers are more risk averse than owners. On the other hand, 
more diversified wealth across groups of individuals should imply more equal risk preferences. 
This will in case have consequences for the optimal exchange rates, in accordance with 
comments made above. 
ii) No market for foreign exchange. Such a market would make it more difficult for the 
government to manage the exchange rate as prescribed by the solution to our model, since 
speculation tends either to drive the equilibrium exchange rate to its expectation over all possible 
ex post states, or it implies that compensating interest rate differentials between countries are 
required. This is likely to be a more serious problem the greater are the “optimal” exchange rate 
fluctuations between states. This however reinforces the criteria for committing to a monetary 
 
19True, in some countries such as Norway the authorities have tried to stimulate more widespread stock 
ownership through tax reductions for limited quotas of annual mutual-fund investments. Still the overall fraction 
of stock owned in this way is relatively small, and labor unions remain overall sceptical toward such ownership. 
In addition pension funds, which in principle represent future benefits of workers, are large stockholders in 
many countries. The latter should represent no principal problem in our model since pension fund returns do not 
affect the short-run consumption possibilities of workers, given that workers cannot borrow with future pension   25
                                                                                                                                                       
union. 
iii) There is no market for savings and other financial instruments for smoothing real 
income.  This is clearly unrealistic, and an unattractive assumption to many economists. 
Arguably, however, not all risk can be eliminated through these types of markets, in particular 
not for workers. Workers’ incomes, and consumption possibilities, stem from their sale of human 
capital services, which are generally not fully insurable. A large body of empirical evidence 
supports this view, much of it from the U.S. where financial markets of this sort are most 
developed and available in practice to ordinary workers. Mankiw (2000) and Seidman (2001) 
review this literature, and find that consumption is highly correlated with current income, much 
more than one should expect if households actually used efficient financial markets for 
consumption smoothing.
20  These results can follow from either imperfect capital markets, or 
simply an inability of households to actually smooth consumption, or both. In any case, there 
may clearly be room for active income-smoothing policies by the government, and a fixed 
exchange rate may serve exactly such a role here. Firm owners should also clearly have greater 
possibilities for smoothing consumption relative to current earnings, both because they likely 
face fewer frictions in the relevant financial markets and because owners are likely to have more 
savings available for immediate consumption. 
iv)  All output is exported while all consumption is imported. This assumption involves two 
different aspects. First, all goods are assumed to be tradables. A more traditional approach in the 
recent literature is to assume a tradable and nontradable sector (as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 
1998), Devereux and Engel (1998, 1999) and Hau (2000), in the context of two-country models). 
 
payments as collateral.   
20 Among important studies showing this are Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), 
Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999). In fact, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimate that approximately half of all 
wage income in the U.S. goes to households that consume according to current income, and half to households 
that consume according to permanent income (as would result with effectively functioning financial markets).   26
Generally, a nontradable sector should tend to smooth consumption when the variation in p is 
interpreted as a terms-of-trade shock, but not necessarily when it is interpreted as a productivity 
shock that also comprises the nontradable sector itself. Secondly, it implies that the country itself 
produces no export goods that are also imported. A straightforward alternative is here to assume 
that the country’s export goods constitute a certain fraction of its import goods. This can in the 
model be represented by a positive correlation between import and export prices, such that 
import prices change in the same direction but by less than export prices. A likely effect is then a 
greater optimal variation in the exchange rate than that found above (in particular when the 
optimal rule above implies small exchange rate variations). 
v) The exchange rate is pre-set by a monetary authority to optimise a long-run 
intertemporal utility function withoug facing credibility problems.  In the optimization 
sense, the model is “normative” rather than positive, in attempting to say what the government 
ought to do, not necessarily what the government actually does. Absent a currency union 
credibility problems will always be present, in part because a country’s government is likely to 
change from time to time. It could be relevant to take such credibility issues more directly into 
consideration the model, when discussing the desirability of whether or not join a currency 
union. While this must be a topic for further work, such additional arguments appear to favor a 
currency union, relative to the analysis presented above. Another issue for future work is whether 
a monetary authority, through its exchange rate policy or possibly in coordination with other 
government policies, may be able to affect real wages and thereby average employment more 
directly.  
     Finally, one may consider the relationship between the results from the current model with a 
more traditional discussion of possible reasons for wanting an independent monetary policy, 
based on the idea of asymmetric shocks. Asymmetric supply shocks can here be interpreted as   27
                                                
idiosyncratic shocks to export prices, while asymmetric demand shocks can in our model rather 
be identified with shocks to import prices.
21 Given these interpretations, the exchange rate should 
here be kept ”roughly” constant in view of supply shocks, but possibly vary more when shocks 
are demand-related. This conclusion is somewhat at odds with ”conventional wisdom” as 
expressed e.g. in the traditional ”optimum currency area” literature referred to above, and is more 
in line with recent arguments, e.g. Buiter (1997, 2000).
22 
 Our analysis thus supports, and gives a 
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